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￿ The crisis has contributed to a slowdown in global trade volumes, with trade vir-
tually stagnant in the twelve months to July 2013. In this context, fruitful negotia-
tions in the World Trade Organisation’s 9th Ministerial Conference in Bali are crucial
to sustain the institution’s credibility and prove that multilateral negotiations can
still deliver success.
￿ WTO trade talks are the only ongoing trade liberalisation process that has deve-
lopment at its core. The Doha mini-package under consideration at Bali is a collec-
tion of watered-down but deliverable elements of a deal comprising agriculture,
trade facilitation and special and differential treatment/less developed country
concessions.
￿ Post-Bali, the WTO should aim to reverse the current disenchantment with multila-
teral trade negotiations. This means formulating a relevant trade negotiating
agenda with an understanding of global value chains at its core. 
￿ However, the transition to the new agenda requires a closure of the ongoing Round.
The easiest way to conclude the Doha Round would be to select another discrete
set of deliverables that fulfills the development commitment of the Doha Deve-
lopment Agenda, thus paving the way for a new Round. 
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BURIED AMID THE CONTINUOUS STREAM of
finance- and growth-related bad news in recent
times was the fact that the global trade volume
was virtually stagnant in the 12 months to mid-
20131. Even worse, World Trade Organisation
(WTO) economists now predict global trade growth
to be slower than previously forecast. The WTO
now expects trade volumes to grow at rates lower
than GDP in 2013 and only slightly faster in 2014,
in sharp contrast to a world trade growth rate that
was nearly double the real global GDP growth rate
between 1980-20112. The lingering effects of the
2008 financial crisis and consequent collapse in
developed country growth, in particular in Europe,
and the growth moderation in the large emerging
markets, have contributed to this trade slowdown
in a big way.
It is against this backdrop that the WTO’s 160
members3are making another attempt to reap an
‘early harvest’ from the ongoing Doha Round nego-
tiations, in the form of a limited agreement called
the Bali mini-package, which would break the cur-
rent deadlock and help revive global trade flows.
The ongoing negotiation stasis at the WTO has
been a key reason for the increasing turn to
regionalism worldwide, in particular towards
super-regional trade agreements (super-RTAs)4
that can potentially threaten the supremacy of the
WTO-led multilateral trading regime. The WTO has
estimated the current costs of trading across bor-
ders at US$2 trillion, and regulating border trade
barriers plus cutting red-tape-related costs in the
Bali package can provide a major stimulus to the
world economy and boost trade flows as future
trade costs decline5.
The Bali talks (formally the WTO’s 9th Ministerial
Conference, MC9 )6mark 12 years since the Doha
meeting that initiated an extremely ambitious
agenda for multilateral trade liberalisation. Over
the past decade, while realism has steadily
replaced aspiration7 as agreements on several
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issues have proved very hard to reach, reaching
some form of agreement has also become imper-
ative if only to restore faith in the WTO’s market-
access negotiating prowess and its ability to forge
new global trade rules. WTO Director-General
Roberto Azevêdo has acknowledged that the WTO’s
credibility in its negotiation pillar depends on
delivering a deal8, but “the risk of failure is still
present” with little time left to deal with the
remaining “big icebergs”9. This Policy Contribution
reviews ongoing negotiations in Geneva and the
national capitals on the proposals of the Bali pack-
age, and then discusses the imperatives of the
WTO’s post-Bali market-access negotiations.
DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS AND MC9
The current multilateral trade negotiation round
was officially launched at the WTO’s 4th Ministe-
rial Conference in Doha in November 2001. The
Doha Ministerial Declaration gave a mandate for
negotiations, including on agriculture and serv-
ices, and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) and public health10, work
on which had begun earlier. The work programme
covers about 20 areas of trade. The Round is also
semi-officially known as the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA), because one of its fundamental
objectives is to improve the trade-led growth
prospects of developing countries. This feature dif-
ferentiates the WTO-led trade negotiations from
the clearly mercantilist motivations of the newly
launched super-RTAs. In a scathing remark during
the last weeks of his tenure, the then WTO Direc-
tor-General Pascal Lamy had said “those clever
people who have declared Doha dead are missing
the point of a process that is unique among trade
negotiations in having development at its core”
(Donnan, 2013b).
Although hibernating since July-2008, the Doha
Round was formally declared to be at an impasse
in 2011 at the MC8. However, since early 2013,03
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BOX 1: STATE OF PLAY – PRE-BALI NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA
The Bali mini-package mainly comprises the three potential deliverable areas – agriculture, trade facil-
itation and special and differential treatment/least developed country (S&DT/LDC) issues. The possi-
bility to include other elements, such as the dispute settlement review and the negotiations on
Information Technology Agreement expansion (ITA-2), Government Procurement and Cotton have now
receded given inadequate progress in these sectoral discussions.
Despite the significant progress in negotiations ahead of Bali, the Bali package is yet to be sealed,
with trade facilitation having emerged as the surprise late-day deal blocker. The state of play as on
26 November 2013 is briefly outlined below:
Agriculture:the currently agreed upon package has been put forward as a down-payment on a bigger
set of issues under negotiation as part of the Doha Round of trade talks. Two prominently contentious
issues on ‘export competition’ and ‘subsidies for food security’ seem to have been largely resolved with
the EU and India respectively having agreed to the compromises offered. The latest drafts on export
subsidies would commit WTO members to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that progress is
maintained towards the elimination of all forms of export subsidies and other measures with equiva-
lent effects, and commit members to keep these measures significantly below current commitments.
On the proposal concerning public stockholding for food security and domestic food aid, India’s accept-
ance of the four-year term of the peace clause for breach of the WTO subsidy limit of 10 percent of the
total farm output has helped to push the negotiations, albeit after the WTO membership agreed to a
post-Bali discussion on a permanent solution on farm subsidies before 2017.
The US-China standoff on tighter disciplines for tariff rate quotas (TRQs) administration seems to also
have been resolved with the creation of a special list that would allow developed countries to opt out
from providing enhanced market access under the new rules after the WTO’s 12th MC in 2019. Only the
US is on the list as all other developed country members have assurance of not joining the US in opting
out of the post-2019 requirements.
Trade Facilitation(WTO-speak for easing border barriers to trade): negotiations involve specific com-
mitments countries will take to improve their customs procedures (Section I), and the special and dif-
ferential treatment for developing and least developed countries (Section II). Despite substantial
progress initially, the discussions are now stuck on how to balance the obligations of developing coun-
tries and the assistance granted to them. The trade facilitation mandate is notable in that it also
includes language saying that developing countries will not be required to implement the commit-
ments they take in Section I of the agreement unless they receive the technical assistance to do so.
Until recently, the customs cooperation issues were one of hardest parts of negotiation; this was how-
ever resolved in October 2013. The remaining differences are primarily in Section I of the draft text, with
around 50 or so items yet to be agreed upon. The discussions clearly require more signals of flexibil-
ity, but while meetings within smaller groups suggest existence of solutions on the horizon in most
areas, lack of convergence has resulted in the uncertainty of the Bali outcome.
Development issues:negotiations on special and differential treatment (S&DT) have resulted in pos-
itive and steady advances on the Monitoring Mechanism and the 28 Cancún Agreement-specific pro-
posals, with the current draft text indicating that the Monitoring Mechanism will serve as a focal point
within the WTO to analyse and review all aspects of implementation of S&DT provisions. The priority
LDC issues – duty free, quota free (DFQF) market access; rules of origin; cotton; and implementation
of the LDCs services waiver – currently contain no brackets. However, the impasse announced on 26
November 2013 by Director-General Roberto Azevêdo has – as with the rest of the Bali package – left
the future of these texts an open question.
Source: Reporting by the WTO Secretariat and weekly news reports by the Geneva-based think-tank ICTSD.THE WTO’S POST-BALI IMPERATIVES
The lack of progress in the Doha Round negotia-
tions is often blamed on an outdated negotiating
agenda, one that deals with the twentieth century
trade issues like tariffs. Some analysts recom-
mend that the Doha Round be abandoned in
favour of a new round with a new agenda that
addresses the present day economic and trade
concerns. Notwithstanding the outcome at Bali,
however, proper closure of the Doha Round is nec-
essary before one can move onto a new round
(Karmakar, 2009). Attaining this closure at the ear-
liest should be the main item on the WTO’s post-
Bali agenda, to exploit the present negotiating
momentum and hard-won zeal for cooperation
and compromise between members. After the
formal acknowledgement of the impasse in 2011,
the Bali package was plucked from the wider Doha
agenda as a watered-down but ‘deliverable’ set of
elements for a deal. But as the members’ experi-
ences in the past year have shown, even agreeing
on this watered-down version has involved tough
choices by all the key stakeholders, including the
toning down of entrenched rhetorical positions.
The positive takeaway here is: multilateral nego-
tiations can still deliver success, albeit at low
levels of ambition. But the present euphoria of
achievement should not be allowed to dissipate.
The Doha trade talks started at a time of great polit-
ical vulnerability, having been launched just after
the September 11 attacks in the US. The popular
thinking of the time prompted WTO members to
agree on an idealistic objective of promoting
developing countries’ interests and prioritising
agriculture. Many of these developing economies
are today performing much better than the crisis-
ridden OECD countries in spite of the recent gen-
eral growth nose-dive. Their better performance
has skewed the balance of economic power and
consequently revised the expectations of devel-
oping countries, in particular larger trading nations
such as China, Brazil and India11. For developed
countries, meanwhile, fear of losing past influence
while negotiating in a democratic one-country-
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‘Proper closure of the Doha Round is necessary before one can move onto a new round. Attaining
this closure at the earliest should be the main item on the WTO’s post-Bali agenda, to exploit the
present negotiating momentum and hard-won zeal for cooperation and compromise.’
there have been signs of movement in the
negotiations. At MC8 in Geneva in 2011, trade
ministers formally directed the global trade body’s
members to explore new negotiating approaches
in light of the stalemate in the trade talks;
members since then have been realistic and
pragmatic in order to avoid jeopardising the mini-
Doha deliverables package for MC9. Work on
preparing a Bali outcome of a ‘mini-package’ or an
‘early harvest’ of deliverables from the Doha
Round began at a formal Trade Negotiation
Committee meeting in December 2012. In contrast
to analysts’ wishful claims, however, WTO
members have repeatedly stressed that any early
package would not be the end of the line, but
rather a milestone to gather momentum for the full
conclusion of the Doha Round.
Talks in Geneva in the run-up to MC9 involved
hectic negotiations on the three potential deliver-
able areas – agriculture, trade facilitation and spe-
cial and differential treatment/least developed
country (S&DT/LDC) issues (see Box 1 for a sum-
mary of the pre-Bali negotiation status in these
areas). Overall, it appears that all the recent work
at Geneva has generated the broad contours of
convergence on the main sticking points of the
deliverables of the Bali mini-package, including in
the agriculture pillar that was the weakest part of
the structure. Taking the last steps and overcom-
ing unforeseen problems to sign the Ministerial
agreement however calls for a continued show of
strong political will and flexibility from the largest
trading nations, in particular on the outstanding
Trade Facilitation negotiating elements. As
accepted by all, an MC9 declaration with some lib-
eralisation commitments will go a long way to
restoring confidence in the multilateral trading
system’s ability to deliver on its negotiation pillar,
a much needed confidence boost in the present
tough times of weak economic growth and sub-
dued trade flows.Suparna Karmakar  LIFE AFTER BALI
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one-vote WTO system today, has  in view of some
analysts, led to the renewed zeal for super-RTAs12.
Whether or not one accepts this reasoning for the
strategic shift in the US and the EU’s trade negoti-
ating focus towards regional and bilateral agree-
ments, it is certain that the perceived lack of
worthwhile gains from the Doha Round has
resulted in all major global trading nations redi-
recting their negotiating capital to presumably
more viable bilateral and regional deals13. The feel-
ing of irrelevance reigns supreme in the business
disenchantment with the DDA14.
Many countries also seem satisfied with the
status quo and appear to be in no particular hurry
to introduce new global rules to regulate multilat-
eral trade in present times of extreme uncertainty
and weak growth15. The WTO’s post-Bali imperative
to regain its past credibility therefore needs to be
based on crafting a time-relevant trade negotiat-
ing agenda to reverse the current disenchantment
with multilateralism, which in turns calls for a con-
clusion to the Doha Round at the earliest. But
quickly delivering on the development round as
proposed under DDA in order to move onto a new
trade agenda requires that members do not com-
plicate the current negotiating process further by
adding onto the existing Doha agenda in a mis-
guided wish to provide gains for all under the
single undertaking mandate. It may be recalled
that one of the perceived reasons for the DDA
negotiation stasis is an overloaded agenda.
Of the several identified causes for the
intractability of the Doha Round, the western
analysts largely underplay the fact that over time,
developed countries tended to consider the DDA
as yet another mercantilist trade round, ignoring
the development aspect agreed upon at the time
of the launch of the Round. However, it may be
worth considering that a satisfactory agreement
in the agriculture market access and farm-subsidy
negotiations in favour of the developing and least-
developed countries could well turn out to be the
most effective means to get the Round completed,
as it will best fulfil the DDA’s development
mandate.
From this perspective, the easiest way to conclude
the Doha Round (assuming the Bali-package will
be implemented immediately and reforms are not
backloaded) will be for the members to pick out
another select set of development-focused
deliverables from the expansive DDA agenda and
quickly negotiate on them, with a clear objective of
clearing the deck to enable the WTO membership
to embark on the new trade agenda. Speed is of
the essence in order to benefit from the current
momentum of negotiations and the feeling of
compromise in favour of multilateral trade
negotiations.
Agriculture has remained the key stumbling block
for conclusion of the Doha Round and one of the
major bones of contention between the developed
countries and the rest in the Doha Round agricul-
ture negotiations (Matthews, 2013). A large part
of the agriculture negotiations in DDA, it may be
recalled, is basically housekeeping and legacy
issues from the Uruguay Round. Notwithstanding
their public posturing at the WTO, negotiators from
developing and least-developed countries, and in
particular those with significant market access
interest, agree in private that it is difficult to get
over the feeling of deception over developed coun-
tries’ unfulfilled Uruguay Round agricultural com-
mitments16. Thus, in order to assuage the feelings
of this large group of stakeholders and make them
more likely to be flexible in other areas, conced-
ing in agricultural negotiations is necessary. For
sure, developed countries will need to address
this particular elephant in the room if they wish to
lend serious support to the WTO beyond paying
lip-service to the cause of trade multilateralism.
And this calls for political will and grit to step out of
the comfort zone and habit of receiving conces-
sions without making any major concessions,
which was possible in the early GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) days when devel-
oped countries had full control of the trade nego-
tiating agenda and the pace of liberalisation to suit
their own domestic openness. Throughout the his-
tory of GATT and early WTO, the developed coun-
tries have not had to make any difficult
concessions even in tariff liberalisation commit-
ments while negotiating the global trade agree-
ment, unlike the developing country members.
The former simply committed their domestic
regime in the WTO in exchange for tough conces-
sions from developing countries and the countries
in accession.LIFE AFTER BALI Suparna Karmakar
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An important bone of contention in the pre-Bali
negotiations was the G-33 (Group of 33 develop-
ing countries with large populations of smallholder
farmers) proposal concerning public stockholding
for food security and domestic food aid17. An
objective of the proposal is the need to correct the
imbalance in the treatment of subsidies between
developed and developing countries. This histori-
cal inequity can only be addressed under DDA,
and the conditional Bali mini-package has an in-
principle agreement from the WTO membership to
negotiate on the agriculture subsidies and their
classification issues by 2017. With the recent
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms, how-
ever, the EU is better placed than the US to be
proactive and to attempt a resolution in post-Bali
agricultural negotiations18.
The same concession-making mindset is needed
for negotiations on other domestic regulations and
practices; the US approach to regulatory harmon-
isation under the WTO is to apply its domestic reg-
ulatory reforms on a global basis, while urging the
rest to accept the US approach to regulating, most
critically seen during the anti-dumping negotia-
tions on zeroing19and the discussions at the WTO
on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary and Technical Bar-
riers to Trade measures.
However, a solution to the Doha Round impasse
cannot be found within the agricultural negotia-
tions alone. Also key from a developing country
perspective is putting to rest the unfinished busi-
ness of industrial goods liberalisation, especially
the persistent protection in developed countries
of key labour-intensive manufactured goods of
export interest. Some researchers have proposed
that a conditional offer of reduction in tariffs be
made in return for opening negotiations in other
areas, to be otherwise revoked by the countries
concerned if sufficient progress is not seen. How-
ever drawbacks remain from the same unresolved
special and differential reciprocity problem which
has dogged the Doha Round negotiations.
But given the tortuous industrial goods tariffs
negotiations in the past ten years, it appears that
an easy way could be for the major developing
countries to unilaterally make the commitment to
bind the applied industrial tariffs in exchange for
elimination of tariff peaks and tariff escalation in
developed countries in labour-intensive manu-
factured products such as apparel and footwear.
Global trade liberalisation has progressed most
satisfactorily when countries have made uncon-
ditional unilateral offers of liberalisation out of
self-interest (including global public good) moti-
vations, rather than through reciprocal market
access negotiation. In the new areas of trade, for-
ward momentum in negotiations cannot be gen-
erated without first trying to resolve the Doha
Round conflicts, and the residual Uruguay Round
misunderstandings.
Furthermore, the post-Doha agenda should not
make the mistake of creating another Doha-style
issue overload – which several North American
trade policy researchers have recommended.
Negotiations should be on a series of narrower and
more focused agreements under WTO auspices as
plurilaterals or any other variable geometry group,
as was attempted during the Tokyo Round. But
more importantly, the new trade liberalisation
agenda should recognise the centrality of global
value chain production and trade patterns when
(re)designing global trade governance rules in
order to reflect new business models and trade
trends; the trade facilitation agreement under dis-
cussion for MC9 is only a part of this requirement,
albeit an important first part.
Ongoing research on the effectiveness of use of
trade defence mechanisms by the EU has identi-
fied that inter-sectoral contradictions and conflicts
of interests within the solar industry value chain
was a key reason for the muting of big-business
support for the recent EU-China solar panel anti-
dumping case (Karmakar, 2013b). This was a
direct consequence of the business and invest-
ment interdependence and intra-sectoral trade in
the solar industries of the disputing sovereigns,
which had made the use of trade defence a costly
‘The new trade liberalisation agenda should recognise the centrality of global value chain
production and trade patterns when (re)designing global trade governance rules in order to
reflect new business models and trade trends.’07
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way of redressing the anti-competitive behaviour
of Chinese exporters. This brings to the fore the pit-
falls of invoking trade defence instruments in the
world of global value chain trade, which must be
reflected in the future WTO round agenda. The cen-
trality of value chain trade in setting the new trade
agenda would also blur the traditional north-south
divide in trade negotiations and thus help in miti-
gating somewhat the increasing concerns of free-
riding by developing countries in their market
access commitments, as allowed under the cur-
rent WTO country classification system20.
Finally, the post-Doha new trade agenda should
carefully avoid bringing in non-trade issues, such
as energy, currencies, sustainable development
and the environment, notwithstanding the great
attraction of the WTO as a desirable global trade
rule monitoring system given its fully functional
and widely respected dispute-settlement mecha-
nism. There is no doubt these are issues for which
global governance needs to be strengthened and
implemented, but it is hard to see how adding
them to the WTO agenda now would raise the prob-
ability of success in the trade negotiations. The
WTO should stick to pure trade and market access
issues, leaving the rest of the laudable concerns in
the care of their respective global organisations. 
NOTES
1 The volume of world merchandise trade (ie goods trade adjusted to account for changes in prices, exchange rates
and seasonal variation) was only up 1.2 percent in the first half of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012.
Source: WTO PRESS/694, 19 September 2013.
2 However, Donnan (2013a) notes that many argue that, in a globalised world where competitiveness of multina-
tional companies are dependent on international supply chains, trade growth can only pick up and head back
towards previous norms once the economies stabilise.
3 Yemen’s accession formalities were completed in late September and the country will formally join the WTO as its
160th member at the Bali Ministerial Conference.
4 The most high profile are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations spearheaded by the US and the recently
launched Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the EU and the US; a third
RTA in the making that involve large trading partners is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agree-
ment (RCEP or the ASEAN+6). These talks are seen as a way around the stalled WTO negotiations, in the hope that
by completing ambitious deals with Europe and the Pacific nations, the US will set an example for the rest of the
world to follow (Cernat, 2013). Since the formation of GATT, notable attempts in regionalism have been EU, ASEAN,
NAFTA, APEC and Mercosur.
5 While it is difficult to accurately predict the exact pecuniary impact of trade facilitation agreement, since the gains
are a function of ambition as well as the exact language of the text of the agreement, projected benefits of improved
trade facilitation are often large. The OECD had calculated that each 1 percent saving in trade-related transaction
costs saves US$43 billion (OECD, 2003). Former DG Pascal Lamy noted in an early 2013 speech that “removing bar-
riers to trade and cutting red tape in half, which is what a multilateral Trade Facilitation Agreement could deliver,
could stimulate the US$22 trillion world economy by more than US$1 trillion... the economic effect of removing all
tariffs”; http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl265_e.htm. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimated
that reforming the information and language barrier (covered under the transparency concept of trade facilitation
negotiations) would have an impact equivalent to a 13 percent tariff reduction while the administrative burden of
trade procedures is equivalent to 8 percent of tariffs.
6 3-6 December 2013, https://mc9.wto.org/. The WTO is legally mandated to hold biennial Ministerial Conferences.
7 Some observers now believe that the priority of the multilateral framework now appears to be to preserve the gains
achieved in the pre-Doha period, mitigating the risks of backsliding towards more and more protectionist actions
by countries, of which there are visible signs and over which the G20 leaders themselves have expressed concern
(Evenett, 2013).
8 Mr Azevêdo told members in his debut address to the WTO’s General Council that “the perception in the world is that
we have forgotten how to negotiate. The perception is ineffectiveness. The perception is paralysis... We must send
a clear and unequivocal message to the world that the WTO can deliver multilateral trade deals”;
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/gc_09sep13_e.htm.
9 Statement at the Informal Meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee, 12 November 2013;
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/tnc_infstat_12nov13_e.htm. 08
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10 The TRIPS and public health discussions address the concerns expressed by developing countries regarding the
possible adverse implications of the TRIPS agreement on access to medicines for the poor, especially during times
of health crisis. The decision adopted by the WTO allows countries that can make drugs to export drugs made under
compulsory licence to countries that cannot manufacture them, a derogation from the TRIPS agreement since prod-
ucts made under compulsory license must normally be predominantly for the domestic market. This makes it easier
for poorer countries to import cheaper generics made under compulsory licensing if they are unable to manufac-
ture these themselves. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.
11 Some developing country analysts however contend that the “US is also portraying as though the emerging
economies are very strong and that they can easily undertake the commitments demanded by the US”and thus
pushing them to adopt a leadership position at the WTO negotiations (Narayanan, 2013).
12 This is particularly relevant for the US, which has abandoned its traditional leadership in the WTO multilateral trade
negotiations in favour of regionalism; US leadership has been conspicuously absent in the Doha Round (Lawrence,
2011), while the US has been aggressively negotiating multiple super-RTAs with like-minded trade partners. The
latter are expected to generate a new momentum for ambitious liberalisation and provide a boost to economic
growth, in particular in the participating developed member countries, as well as reinforce their global influence as
international standard- and rule-setters. The EU has also generally taken a non-aggressive stance in the Doha
Round, and despite supporting consensus building in service sector negotiations, has kept a low profile in most of
the major DDA controversies other than in the agriculture negotiations. 
13 A recent opinion poll in the Asia-Pacific clearly showed the low preference and even disinterest of regional opinion-
leaders to push for Doha’s conclusion; only 8.4 percent of respondents were convinced that a conclusion for the WTO
DDA was likely by 2015, as opposed to 33 percent for TPP, 19.1 percent for TTIP and 18.8 percent for RCEP. 
14 Chart 2.16, PECC (2013). The WTO DDA has steadily dropped as a priority for APEC leaders over the years from a
high of 52.1 percent in 2007 to a low of 15.7 percent this year. Of even greater concern is the lack of interest from
the business community, only 10.9 percent of whom thought APEC leaders should spend time discussing the
Round, compared to 37.2 percent who thought time should be spent on regional economic integration and cor-
ruption. More importantly there are now serious systemic questions facing the multilateral trading system that
outweigh estimates of economic benefits. It is clear at least from this survey that high level business support for
negotiators to make concessions is going to be limited.
15 In fact, in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, popular perception in the developed countries has turned decidedly
anti-globalist. Even the developing countries, including the large emerging markets, seem to have concluded that
there was not enough offered by the developed countries to further dismantle their own policy barriers.
16 Crucial to understanding the dynamic of the negotiations on agriculture in the Doha Round is the sense of grievance
felt by developing countries about the outcome of the Uruguay Round, including in agriculture (Ostry, 2000). The
broad outline of the Uruguay Round bargain was that developing countries accepted disciplines in new areas such
as services trade, intellectual property and investment in return for market access concessions by developed
countries in the areas of agriculture and textiles and clothing which was not satisfactorily met. Resentment was felt
for a number of reasons, including dirty tariffication and the flexibility offered by the modalities of liberalisation
(such as selection of base year and backloading of commitments) which meant that developed countries offered
little additional market access (Matthews, 2013).
17 JOB/AG/22, also endorsed by the UNCTAD and now the European Parliament (EP document B7-0493/2013, dated
13 November 2013). The proposal suggests that governments in developing countries would be allowed to pur-
chase unlimited food at government-set prices (not market prices) with the objective of stocking it for food secu-
rity purposes, without this being considered as trade-distorting domestic support. The existing WTO food subsidy
rules are stricter than those governing the rich world’s export subsidies for farmers. Research in the past decade
has clearly shown that in the presence of high degree of dumping in agriculture (for example, the dumping margin
of US agri-businesses exports between 1990-2003 was 10 percent below cost for corn and more than 50 percent
for cotton), trade liberalisation/ free trade has unquestionably failed to improve food security. A summary of the key
proposals can be found at: http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/149960/, and Bellmann et al(2013).
18 As a positive from the negotiation perspective, EU leaders have agreed to reduce overall CAP spending for 2014-20
by 13 percent compared to the 2007-13 period. This is a reversal of the earlier trend of increases in the overall farm
domestic support in developed countries. For a detailed discussion, see, Karmakar (2013a). The cuts in the recently
proposed US Farm Bill on the other hand come from slashing the food stamps programme rather than support for
Big Agriculture.
19 Zeroing is a calculation device used by the US to establish this anti-dumping duty, in which the negative values in
dumping difference calculations are counted as zero. WTO rulings have confirmed that this method increases, often09
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substantially, the exporter’s margin of dumping and thus the amount of anti-dumping duty that the exporter has
to pay.
20 The WTO classifies member countries into three (self-designated) categories – developed, developing and least-
developed – and allows for lesser commitments from the latter two in negotiations for promoting development. In
the Doha Round in particular this has led to major angst from the first group who feel that some of the developing
countries are hiding behind their developing country status and not pulling their weight in the negotiations. Devel-
oping countries have also been accused by some as having gotten the earlier GATT-WTO Rounds for free. Part of this
unjust criticism is due to the fact that countries are allowed to self-designate their development status, which has
led to no country voluntarily moving up the ladder in the WTO, even when they have joined OECD ranks. The other
part stems from the rising feeling in an increasingly anti-globalist west that the WTO rules disproportionately ben-
efit the larger developing countries, a feeling that has intensified further in aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis
and because of the ensuing weakened economic prospects in developed countries.
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